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The Performance of Voluntary Climate Programs:  
Climate Wise and 1605(b) 
William A. Pizer, Richard Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih 
Abstract 
Despite serving as the principal basis of U.S. climate policy over the past two decades, corporate 
voluntary environmental programs have been subject to quite limited evaluation. The self-selection of 
participants—an essential element of such initiatives—poses particular challenges to researchers because 
the decision to participate may not be random and, in fact, may be correlated with the outcomes. The 
present study is designed to overcome these problems by gauging the environmental effectiveness of two 
early voluntary climate change programs with established track records, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Climate Wise program and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases Program, or 1605(b). Both programs provide quite flexible criteria for firms to 
participate. Particular attention is paid to the participation decision and how various assumptions affect 
estimates of program outcomes using propensity score matching methods applied to plant-level Census 
data.  
Overall, we find quite modest effects: the reductions in fuel and electricity expenditures from 
Climate Wise and 1605(b) are no more than 10 percent and probably less than 5 percent. Virtually no 
evidence suggests a statistically significant effect of either Climate Wise or 1605(b) on fuel costs. Some 
evidence indicates that participation in Climate Wise led to a slight (3–5 percent) increase in electricity 
costs that vanished after two years. Stronger evidence suggests that participation in 1605(b) led to a slight 
(4–8 percent) decrease in electricity costs that persisted for at least three years.  
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I. Introduction 
The energy- and greenhouse gas (GHG)–related corporate voluntary environmental 
programs that have served as the principal tool of U.S. climate policy for almost two decades 
have been subject to limited ex post evaluation. The self-selection of participants – an essential 
element of such initiatives – poses particular challenges to researchers because the decision to 
participate may not be random and, in fact, may be correlated with the outcomes. That is, simple 
comparisons of outcomes between participants and nonparticipants may have less to do with 
program effects and more to do with other differences between the two groups. The present study 
is designed to overcome these problems by using propensity score matching applied to plant-
level Census data to gauge the environmental effectiveness of two early voluntary climate 
change programs with established track records, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Climate Wise program and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Voluntary Reporting 
of Greenhouse Gases Program, or 1605(b). Particular attention is paid to the participation 
decision and how various assumptions affect estimates of program outcomes.  
The single voluntary program most subject to ex post evaluation – EPA’s 33/50 program 
– is not related to energy or GHGs at all: studies of this program have benefited from the 
existence of the nonvoluntary Toxics Release Inventory, which served as both a source of 
outcome measures and a universe of observations from which to construct control and treatment 
groups. Interestingly, evaluations of 33/50 have yielded conflicting results. An early study found 
that participants reduced their emissions by 28 percent compared with nonparticipants (Khanna 
and Damon 1999), but a more recent paper finds no significant difference between the two 
groups after accounting for the Montreal Protocol requirements (Gamper-Rabindran 2006). 
There are at least three reasons why the incentives for emissions reduction are different in 
the case of toxics versus energy and GHGs. First, since toxics are typically of local or regional 
                                                 
1 Pizer: U.S. Treasury Department; his work on this paper was completed while he was a full-time senior fellow at 
Resources for the Future. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Treasury Department or 
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concern, the prospects for local recognition for emissions reduction are probably greater than for 
GHGs. Second, toxics can have direct, acute impacts as well as long-term, chronic effects, such 
as cancer and heart disease. Meanwhile, GHGs accumulate for many years, affect the climate, 
and thereby affect ecosystems and overall human well-being over the longer term, often in less 
tangible ways. Third, with no practical opportunity for end-of-pipe abatement, reductions in 
energy-related GHG emissions often amount to reductions in energy use itself, which in turn, 
given the underlying positive price on energy, results in fuel cost savings. At the same time, 
toxic emissions are often an unpriced industrial byproduct whose existence was widely ignored 
until the Bhopal accident in the late 1980s introduced a significant threat of regulation. For all 
these reasons, firms may have greater incentives as well as more low-cost opportunities to reduce 
toxic releases than to cut energy usage or GHG emissions. 
A key feature of this paper is its use of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983), a technique not commonly employed in the literature on the evaluation of voluntary 
environmental programs. This matching approach is contrasted with the more widely used two-
stage method of Heckman and Hotz (1985). As described below, the former method puts greater 
emphasis on matching participants and nonparticipants, and the latter emphasizes model 
specification. As a source of control information, we are fortunate to have access to the 
confidential files of the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). Despite the 
relatively long track record of the two programs examined, the nature and breadth of information 
available on the control group, and the use of alternative modeling approaches, we find quite 
modest effects of the Climate Wise and 1605(b) programs.  
The plan of the paper is straightforward. Section II briefly reviews the relevant literature 
on energy- and GHG-related voluntary programs. Section III provides background on the two 
programs examined, Section IV outlines the data and models used in the analysis, and Section V 
presents the results. Section VI discusses the conclusions. 
II. Literature on Energy- and GHG-Related Voluntary Programs 
The early energy- and GHG-related corporate voluntary programs date to the President 
George H.W. Bush era, but the largest number of such programs were initiated during the 
Clinton administration, many in the Climate Change Action Plan in 1993. Most of these 
programs seek to spur adoption of particular technologies; others focus on emissions reductions 
per se, without regard to specific technologies. The former include such well-known programs as 
Green Lights, Motor Challenge, and Energy Star Buildings. Over the years, many changes in 
program organization and design have occurred. Energy Star, for example, has expanded Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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considerably and now covers 45 kinds of products. Climate Wise and 1605b count among the 
nontechnology-oriented programs developed in the early 1990s. A major challenge in evaluating 
both types of programs is the establishment of a credible baseline. Most assessments, especially 
among the technology-oriented programs, have relied on constructed baselines.2 This contrast 
with the approach of the present paper, which involves the observation of a baseline. 
Climate Challenge and 1605(b), the two such programs that have been most subject to 
rigorous analysis, including careful attention to the self-selection issue, are both operated by 
DOE. Climate Challenge, begun in 1994 as a departmental initiative, had as a principal focus 
commitments by electric utilities to reduce, avoid, or sequester greenhouse gases by the year 
2000. Utilities were invited to establish their own targets for emissions reductions, develop their 
own approaches for achieving the reductions, and self-report on their progress through 1605(b) 
and/or other means. As of this writing, Climate Challenge is no longer in operation. The 1605(b) 
program, strictly a reporting initiative, was open to a broader collection of industries, although 
electric utilities were disproportionately represented. As further described in the next section, 
1605(b) began in 1994, as mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. A revamped version 
remains in operation today. Evaluations of Climate Challenge have been conducted by Welch et 
al. (2000) and by Montes-Sancho et al. (2007). The sole prior evaluation of 1605(b) was 
conducted by Lyon and Kim (2006), who focused on the performance of electric utilities, as 
opposed to manufacturing firms, which are examined in the present paper. 
 Welch et al. (2000) report that on average, the 50 largest utilities in their sample reduced 
their CO2 emissions by 6.3 million tons per firm over the sample period (1995–97), more than 
twice the amount initially pledged. At the same time, nonparticipating firms reduced their 
emissions by a larger amount. Thus, Welch et al. conclude that participation in the Climate 
Challenge program most likely had no impact on GHG emissions. In fact, some of their results 
suggest it may have had a detrimental impact on environmental performance. Nevertheless, DOE 
credits Climate Challenge with “… shift[ing] … the thinking of electric utility management and 
strategic planners to include the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions into their corporate 
culture and philosophy.”3 
                                                 
2 For example, Sanchez et al. (2008) and Horowitz (2007, 2004, 2001) all use constructed baselines.  For related 
analyses, see DeCanio (1998), DeCanio and Watkins (1998), Dowd et al. (2001), and Howarth et al. (2000), which 
also use constructed baselines. 
3 Climate Challenge Executive Summary, 
http://www.climatevision.gov/climate_challenge/execsumm/execsumm.htm. Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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The subsequent analysis by Montes-Sancho et al. (2007) distinguishes between early and 
late joiners. Like Welch et al. (2000), they find no overall difference in emissions reductions 
between program participants and nonparticipants. At the same time, they find that early joiners 
do reduce emissions significantly more than nonparticipants. Unfortunately, this favorable 
performance of the early joiners is cancelled out by the behavior of late joiners. The authors 
hypothesize that late joiners, who are smaller and subject to less political pressure than the initial 
participants, free-ride on the substantive efforts of the early joiners. As Lyon and Maxwell 
(2007) note, this suggests the participation of the late joiners “… can be viewed as a form of 
‘greenwash’ designed to deflect attention from their actual environmental performance.”4  
Lyon and Kim (2006) examine the performance of electric utilities participating in 
DOE’s 1605(b) program, using a Heckman-Hotz (1985) two-stage model to analyze both the 
decision to participate and the subsequent performance of the firm. The authors find that 
participants tend to be larger, with higher and more rapidly increasing emissions than 
nonparticipants. They also find that participation has no measurable effect on a firm’s carbon 
intensity. Lyon and Kim conclude that participation in 1605(b) may be an attempt by firms to 
appear more environmentally friendly than is really the case—that is, to engage in greenwashing. 
III. Background on Climate Wise and 1605b 
The Climate Wise Program  
Officially established by EPA in 1993, Climate Wise was a performance-based voluntary 
program focusing on the nonutility industrial sector to encourage the reduction of CO2 and other 
GHGs without regard to specific technologies5 via adoption of energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and pollution prevention technologies. Climate Wise remained in operation until 2000, 
when it was renamed and placed under the agency’s Energy Star umbrella. Subsequently, it was 
terminated altogether. At its peak, Climate Wise had enrolled more than 600 industrial firms 
covering several thousand facilities nationwide. EPA conducted internal studies, but there has 
been no outside evaluation of the program. 
                                                 
4 Lyon and Maxwell (2007, 732). 
5 The stated goals of Climate Wise were to (1) encourage the immediate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in 
the industrial sector through a comprehensive set of cost-effective actions; (2) change the way companies view and 
manage environmental performance by demonstrating the economic and productivity gains associated with ‘lean and 
clean’ manufacturing; (3) foster innovation by allowing participants to identify the actions that make the most sense 
for their organizations; and (4) develop productive and flexible partnerships within government and between 
government and industry. See Climate Wise 1998 Progress Report (U.S. EPA 1998, 2). Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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The program consisted of three interrelated components: (i) a pledge component asked 
firms to commit to taking cost-effective, voluntary actions to reduce GHG emissions; (ii) tailored 
assistance efforts were designed to facilitate companies’ emissions-reducing efforts via a 
clearinghouse, workshops, and seminars; and (iii) communications activities provided public 
recognition for actual progress in reducing emissions. 
To join Climate Wise, a firm had to develop a baseline estimate of its direct emissions of 
CO2 (and other GHGs) for the year it joined the program or any year of its choice since 1990.6 A 
more detailed emissions inventory was not required. The firm was also required to identify 
specific actions it proposed to undertake to reduce its emissions and, for each action, to indicate 
whether it was a “new,” “expanded,” or “accelerated” initiative. To encourage consideration of 
substantial reductions, EPA provided a checklist of major actions to improve equipment and 
processes, including those involving boiler efficiency, air compressor systems, and others. EPA 
also suggested fuel switching, best management practices, and the further integration of energy 
efficiency in new product design and manufacturing. Firms were strongly encouraged, albeit not 
required, to select at least some of their proposed actions from this list. EPA provided several 
types of technical assistance to participating firms, including a guide to industrial energy 
efficiency, background publications on energy efficiency and related issues, and most 
importantly, free phone consultation with energy experts retained by the agency. Information 
about financial assistance to support emissions-reducing actions was made available, including 
via Small Business Administration guaranteed loans and low-interest buy-downs from state 
providers, utility programs, and others. EPA also held an annual event open to the public to 
recognize the performance of outstanding Climate Wise participants.  
The 1605(b) Program 
Following the mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, DOE’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) issued formal guidelines for measuring and reporting energy and GHG 
reductions in a publicly available database, including provisions to ensure confidentiality of 
sensitive information.  
Although 1605(b) involves fewer participation incentives than Climate Wise, the 
program does provide recognition for entities that reduce GHG emissions or sequester carbon 
voluntarily, and it identifies innovative and effective ways to reduce emissions. Most of the 
                                                 
6 Although the Climate Wise program focused on energy efficiency and the reduction of CO2 emissions, substantial 
reductions of the non-CO2 gases were also reported, especially in the chemical and beer industries. Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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reporting entities are affiliated with one or more other voluntary programs sponsored by EPA or 
other government agencies.  
Consistent with its legislative mandate, the 1605(b) program is extremely flexible. 
Participants can choose to report reductions at the firm or project level and can then define the 
reporting boundary relevant for either the firm or the project.7 Since its inception in 1994, the 
number of reporting entities has doubled, from about 100 to more than 200 per year; the number 
of projects has more than tripled, from about 600 to more than 2,000 per year; and reported 
reductions in direct emissions have more than quadrupled, from 63 million metric tons in 1994 to 
277 million metric tons in 2004, reflecting a 3.9 percent reduction from reported emissions in the 
base year. Although the electric power sector reported more entities, projects, and tons of 
emissions reduced than any other sector, the analysis presented in this study focuses strictly on 
the performance of manufacturing firms.8 
IV. Data and Methods  
For both Climate Wise and 1605(b), we combine participation data from the relevant 
government agencies with outcome data and control observations drawn from the LRD. As 
noted, we focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector. 
Climate Wise Data  
For Climate Wise, we obtained a list of enrolling firms in each year, from 1994 to 2000, 
including identifying information and whether they joined at the corporate level or as individual 
plants. Complete data were available for a total of 671 participants. As shown in Table 1, the 
                                                 
 
8 In summarizing the benefits of 1605(b), EIA notes,  
•  “The program has served to teach staff at many of the largest corporations in the United States how to 
estimate greenhouse gas emissions and has educated them on a range of possible measures to limit emissions. 
•  “The program has helped to provide concrete evidence for the evaluation of activities reported to the many 
government voluntary programs launched since 1993. 
•  “Reporters have been able to learn about innovative emission reduction activities from the experiences of 
their peers. 
•  “The program has created a ‘test’ database of approaches to emission reductions that can be used to 
evaluate future policy instruments aimed at limiting emissions. 
•  “The program has helped to illuminate many of the poorly appreciated emissions accounting issues that 
must be addressed in designing any future approaches to emission limitations.” 
See U.S. EIA 2002, 1–2. Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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number of corporate participants reached a peak in 1996, gradually declining to zero in 2000. 
The number of plant participants continued to increase until 2000. 
The information on program participation was linked to detailed data from the LRD using 
name and, for plant participants, zip code information. We succeeded in linking 377 of the total 
671 participants, including 228 corporate participants and 149 plant participants. The failure to 
link some participants to the Census data reflects the fact that the LRD includes only 
manufacturing establishments, whereas the Climate Wise program, despite its programmatic 
focus on manufacturing, also includes municipalities, universities, and other nonmanufacturing 
participants. These 377 linked participants from the original Climate Wise list translate into 
2,311 facilities because many corporate participants have multiple associated facilities. The 
results of the linking are shown in the left panel of Table 2. 
As displayed in the left panel of Table 3, the principal differences among participants and 
the broader universe of plants in the LRD is that Climate Wise participants are considerably 
larger. Our participant sample is also a very small fraction of the plants in the LRD—roughly 1 
percent. This suggests that the full Census sample is unlikely to be an appropriate control group, 
and that a large number of plants are available from which to choose a more appropriate 
subgroup of controls. 
Linking Climate Wise and Census data has important consequences for our ability to 
evaluate the effect of program participation over longer horizons. Because we are attempting to 
study behavior two or three years after joining, and since Census data are available only through 
2001, we are forced to drop plants that enrolled in 1999 and 2000. Given the steep drop-off in 
new corporate participants after 1998, we do not sacrifice many observations by considering 
performance two to three years from the enrollment date. However, trying to discern effects four 
years after enrollment, with only those participants that joined between 1994 and 1997, we 
would have noticeably fewer observations and noisier estimates. Thus, we do not attempt to 
examine effects more than three years after enrollment. 
1605(b) Data 
For 1605(b) we obtained a list of reporting entities, sectors, years reported, and form type 
used, for the years between 1994 and 2001. As noted, we focus on manufacturing participants, 
which account for about 18 percent of reporting entities, as shown in Table 4.  
Unlike the Climate Wise program, 1605(b) data do not include participants’ enrollment 
dates. Thus, we use the first reporting year as the enrollment year and assume that the Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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participants continued in the program after that, even though individual entities may not have 
continuous reporting years. The right panel of Table 1 displays the enrollment year information 
based on either firm or plant participation.  
We also obtained a separate entity file from EIA that includes entity identification 
numbers and other information. The right panel of Table 4 shows the sector distribution for the 
1605(b) program and LRD linking results. After excluding observations with missing data, the 
linking rate for the industrial sector is about 22 percent, or 83 participants from the original 
1605(b) program list. These, in turn, correspond to 1,791 LRD facilities because corporate 
participants can have multiple facilities. The right panel of Table 2 summarizes the linking of the 
1605(b) data to the LRD. The right panel of Table 3 provides summary statistics for the linked 
sample, as well as the entire LRD for the 1605(b) program. 
Models and Econometric Methods 
With the linked Census data described in the preceding section, we have access to 
variables indicating energy expenditures (separately for fuels and electricity), size (measured by 
the total value of shipments), location, and industry for a sample of manufacturing plants over a 
range of years from 1992 until 2000. We also have linked information on which plants 
participated in each of the two programs and the year in which they first participated. The 
challenge is to control for selection (i.e., the participation decision). Conceptually, we can 
imagine two outcomes, Yi, for every observed plant, i: the value associated with participation, 
Yi(1), and the value associated with nonparticipation, Yi(0). Here, Yi(Di) is the outcome 
associated with either treatment, Di = 1, or nontreatment, Di = 0, and is the cost of either fuels or 
electricity measured in natural logarithms. The ideal study would measure the treatment effect, 
  () () 10 ii YY −  
for each plant – that is, the percentage change in energy expenditures when a plant joins the 
program. The obvious problem is that for every plant, we observe either Yi(1) or Yi(0) but never 
both. The problem, viewed this way, is one of missing data and the fact that selection determines 
which data are observed and which are missing (i.e., who participates).  
The simplest solution, and the one appropriate for randomized experiments, is to assume 
that the missing observations are missing at random (Rubin 1974). Under this assumption, the 
selection mechanism determining which outcomes are observed is ignorable. Formally, 
() () 1, 0 ii i DY Y ⊥  , we can measure the average treatment effect as Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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that is, as the difference in average outcomes between participants and nonparticipants. Or we 
can estimate the treatment effect from a simple regression model 
() 01 ii i i YD D u ββ =+ +   
where we assume that ui is uncorrelated with Di and the treatment effect is the estimated value of 
β1. Of course, in reality, observations are unlikely to be missing at random; in this regression 
model, we have to deal with the correlation of ui with Di. 
One approach would be to build a structural model in which, even though selection, Di, is 
dependent on an unobserved variable, we can still consistently estimate the treatment effect 
(Heckman and Hotz 1985). A major challenge in such an approach is to identify an excluded 
variable – something likely to influence participation but not the outcome. It is such a variable 
that ultimately allows consistent estimation, providing a source of variation in observed 
participation that is “random” from the standpoint of the outcome variable. Although such 
variables can sometimes be found or constructed, none were available for these programs.9  
An alternative approach is propensity score matching, based on work by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) and more recently used by List et al. (2003) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002). When 
it is impossible to identify an excluded variable to create a “clean” source of variation in the 
participation variable, an alternative is to at least rule out outcome variation caused by other 
observable variables. Conditional on all those observed covariates, we could then assume that the 
participation decision is ignorable, or 
() () 1, 0 ii i i DY Y X ⊥  
This condition could be met via a model such as  
01 2 ii i i YX D u β ββ =+⋅+⋅+  (1) 
except that it requires a correct specification of the Xi dependence, lest the estimated effect of the 
program remain mingled with covariates. Instead, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1993) and others 
                                                 
9 Khanna and Damon (1999) use a list based on a letter that was sent to potential participants as an excluded 
variable. No such recruitment effort occurred for these programs. We did consider both distance to the nearest EPA 
regional office and local membership rates in a national environmental organization, based on suggestions from 
early reviewers; however, neither provided any variation in participation rate (the excluded variable has to be 
correlated with participation for this to work). Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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match participants to appropriate nonparticipants and consider the pairwise differences – 
essentially creating a situation where Xi and Di are uncorrelated, so the regression is unbiased 
even without Xi. Thus, while Heckman-Hotz looks for clean variation in participation that is 
sufficiently random to allow one to ignore covariates but requires a strong assumption about an 
excluded variable, this approach tries to remove all sources of observed confounding variation 
but then requires an assumption that the remaining variation is random. When no excluded 
variable exists, the only alternative is the latter. 
The general problem of creating a set of matched, nonparticipating observations is 
challenging because we would want to match the many observable variables – in our case, those 
describing location, industry, size, energy intensity, and growth. However, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show that we need to match only the expected likelihood of participation. That is, 
we reduce the difficult problem of matching all of these different variables to a much simpler one 
of matching a summary variable describing the propensity to join the program. This greatly 
simplifies the creation of matched nonparticipant observations. 
Our model of propensity score – the likelihood of joining the voluntary programs – 
depends on linear and quadratic terms involving value of shipments, cost of fuels, and cost of 
electricity (all in logarithms), as well as dummy variables for census region and two-digit 
industry classification. We also include the change in the logged value of shipments over the 
given time horizon as a control variable. Although this is arguably endogenous, we believe that 
controlling for growth is critical: we observed that faster-growing plants were more likely to join 
voluntary programs. It seems unlikely that this growth was caused by joining; therefore, we need 
to control for it. We use samples matched with different horizons to estimate program effects 
over similar horizons. 
Because both Climate Wise and 1605(b) lasted a number of years, we decided to address 
the decision to join in a duration model framework. That is, in each period, conditional on not 
having joined, there is a given probability of joining based on the noted covariates and time. This 
allows us to combine data across years in estimating our participation model.10 We therefore 
estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of the form: 
                                                 
10 Note that, although the participants are associated with an enrollment year, the nonparticipants are not. In other 
words, plants may participate in various years, but this is not the case for nonparticipation. Outside of a duration 
model, it may not be possible to combine the data. In the Heckman-Hotz approach, we estimate effects for different 
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In this model, each period t has a baseline hazard rate h(t) defining the likelihood that a generic 
facility will join the program, conditional on not having joined previously. That baseline rate is 
then shifted by the various covariates. In the results section, below, we experiment with 
excluding various sets of covariates (industry dummies, region dummies, and quadratic terms). 
Once estimated, we predict hazard rates – propensity scores – for each participating firm 
in the year it enrolls and match it to the nearest-valued nonparticipant (i.e., nonparticipant with 
the closest matching propensity score) in that year. We then examine the difference across each 
pair in the changes in fuel and electricity expenditures over one- to three-year horizons after 
joining, measured in natural logarithms; this difference-in-differences forms the estimate of 
program effectiveness.  
V. Results 
Before presenting our results using the propensity score approach, we give the results of 
using a simple regression model applied to the entire data sample for each of the two programs, 
and each of the two outcome measures (expenditure on fuels and electricity) (Table 5). The 
dependent variable measures the change between the year prior to enrollment by a group of 
participants (a cohort) and two years later; the results are broadly similar for one- and three-year 
horizons. The right-hand-side variables include all the variables used in the above propensity 
score matching model (value of shipments, cost of fuels, cost of electricity, growth in the value 
of shipments, and region and industry dummy variables) and the dummy variable indicating 
whether a firm joins the program in a given year. The coefficient on the participation variable, 
along with information on sample size and number of participants, is shown in the table.  
Among the results for this simple model, we generally estimate small, statistically 
insignificant effects, with changes in energy expenditures of less than 10 percent. The three 
exceptions are a statistically significant 9 percent decline in electricity costs among 1605(b) 
participants in the 1994 cohort, a 6 percent increase in electricity costs among Climate Wise 
participants in the same cohort, and a 55 percent increase in fuel costs among Climate Wise 
participants in the 1999 cohort. The first two effects are not inconsistent with our observations Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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below, that electricity expenditures might increase among Climate Wise participants if efforts to 
reduce direct emissions lead to more electricity use and higher indirect emissions. In addition, a 
positive electricity effect could reflect a combination of specification error and the fact that 
larger or faster-growing firms are more likely to participate in voluntary programs. The third 
effect, a 55 percent increase in fuel expenditures among one cohort of Climate Wise participants, 
reflects an outlier in the rather small sample (96 participants) for that year that cannot be 
accommodated by our simple specification (the much larger estimation error indicates a much 
greater spread in outcomes, not a shift). 
The preceding results ignore the potential for selection bias, which is the main focus of 
this exercise. Therefore, we now turn to the results from the propensity score matching approach 
shown in Tables 6 through 9. As noted in the methods section, we estimate a duration model for 
whether facilities enroll, using a variety of specifications. These specifications differ based on 
whether dummy variables are included for industry and region and whether quadratic terms are 
included, as indicated in the top three rows of each table. For each specification, we consider 
effects over one, two, and three years; we pool across all cohorts of matched pairs and report 
both the mean and the median differences in energy expenditures across pairs. 
As with most of the estimates using the simple model in Table 5, all but one of the 
estimates suggest effects of less than 10 percent (the exception is 11 percent). We focus our 
discussion on the median estimates in the bottom half of each table because they are more robust 
to outlying observations of paired differences. Only 4 of these 72 median estimates are larger 
than 5 percent in magnitude, suggesting that any effect is probably even smaller than 10 percent. 
In general, the estimated changes in electricity expenditures are more likely to be statistically 
significant (6 of 36 estimates) than are the estimated changes in fuel expenditures (1 of 36). 
Interestingly, participation in 1605(b) seems to have a negative effect on electricity expenditures 
of perhaps several percentage points (Table 7, where 17 of 18 median estimates are negative), 
whereas Climate Wise appears, if anything, to have a slight positive effect on electricity 
expenditures (Table 9, where 14 of 18 median estimates are positive). The positive effect of 
Climate Wise is not present in our most general matching model (Table 9, where median 
estimates in column one are not significant); however, the negative effect of 1605(b) is present in 
this model (Table 7, where median estimates in column one are significant). Further, we found 
no evidence of persistence in the Climate Wise results: the effects at the three-year horizon are 
all lower than at two years (see bottom two rows of Table 9). Meanwhile, estimates of 1605(b) 
effects in four out of six models are greatest for the longest horizon (bottom row of Table 7). 
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Overall, we summarize these results as follows. 
1.  The effects of Climate Wise and 1605(b) on fuel and electricity expenditures are 
no more than 10 percent and probably less than 5 percent. 
2.  We found virtually no evidence of a statistically significant effect of either 
Climate Wise or 1605(b) on fuel costs. 
3.  Some statistically significant evidence suggests that participation in Climate Wise 
led to a slight (3–5 percent) increase in electricity costs that vanishes after two 
years. 
4.  Some statistically significant evidence suggests that participation in 1605(b) led to 
a slight (4–8 percent) decrease in electricity costs that persists for at least three 
years. 
The transient, slight increase in electricity costs under Climate Wise is clearly 
unexpected. Two explanations seem plausible. First, participating plants may have pursued direct 
emissions reductions that required increased electricity use. Ignoring the indirect emissions 
associated with electricity use, this technically reduces emissions as defined by the program 
goals, but with the unintended consequence of higher indirect emissions from electricity use. 
Lower direct emissions might not show up in the cost-of-fuel measure because of fuel switching; 
for example, a shift to biomass or gas from coal might reduce emissions without changing 
expenditures. Alternatively, plants may have pursued nonenergy-related emissions reductions –
such as the reduction of N2O emissions at chemical plants – that are not reflected in a lower cost 
of fuels. 
A positive effect on electricity expenditures may also reflect a failure to adequately 
control for growth. Although we matched participants with nonparticipants based, in part, on 
growth in the value of shipments, the tendency for faster-growing firms to enroll in both 
programs remains troubling because of its potential impact if we do not carefully control for this 
behavior. For example, we have no way of knowing about the underlying factors: participants 
might experience changes in quantities, whereas nonparticipants matched from the LRD might 
experience changes in prices. We cannot tease out controls that have that same pattern because 
details on prices and quantities are not available. If the estimated electricity expenditure growth 
effect really reflects an underlying and uncorrected difference in growth between participants 
and controls, then fixing it would presumably raise the growth rate of the control group and 
make the estimated program effect on electricity and fuel costs more negative. Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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VI. Conclusions 
Thus far, the rigorous assessment of the environmental performance of energy- or GHG-
related voluntary programs has been limited. The major challenge is to measure performance 
relative to an observed baseline. In the present study, we examine an EPA program and a DOE 
program, relying on confidential plant-level data for the manufacturing sector collected by the 
U.S. Census Bureau through 2001 to develop such a baseline based on a comparable set of 
nonparticipant controls. We do this via a propensity score matching approach, where we match 
participants to appropriate nonparticipants based on observable characteristics, and consider 
pairwise differences. As noted, the reductions are quite modest and, in at least one case, suggest 
an increase in electricity expenditures, although that effect vanishes after two years. At the same 
time, the findings of modest, albeit statistically significant, reductions in electricity expenditures 
for 1605(b) reporters may have implications for other government-sponsored voluntary 
programs. Recall that most of the entities reporting under 1605(b) are also affiliated with one or 
more other government-sponsored programs. Thus, the observed emissions reductions for 
1605(b) reporters may reflect the influence of not only the 1605(b) program itself but also other 
programs. Although our separate assessment suggests that Climate Wise participation is probably 
not associated with significant emissions reductions, larger programs, including those that have 
more prescriptive participation criteria than the programs examined herein, such as EPA’s 
Energy Star, may be more effective. Unfortunately, the EIA reporting form does not require 
disclosure of the names of other programs in which a firm participates.  
Methodologically, our study highlights the inevitable complexity of assessing voluntary 
programs. Our study reinforces the work of others in emphasizing the importance of 
distinguishing between the participation decision and the environmental outcomes achieved. Our 
work also points to the value of working with micro-level data and the particular need to take 
special care in matching otherwise disparate samples to obtain a credible control group. This 
process is all the more difficult in our case, where the samples were not coded via a uniform 
system. In terms of estimation, we eschewed the more typical Heckman-Hotz method to 
selection bias because of the difficulty in finding excluded variables; instead we followed the 
propensity score matching approach of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We believe that such an 
approach may have wider applicability in the future evaluation of voluntary programs. 
 Finally, we call the reader’s attention to an intriguing observation by Lyon and Maxwell 
(2007) about the limits of an evaluation methodology, applied here and elsewhere, that compares 
the performance of participating firms with that of nonparticipants. Specifically, Lyon and 
Maxwell argue that if information on abatement diffuses to nonparticipants as well as to Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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participants, then one would expect all firms to reduce their emissions at roughly the same rate, 
which appears to be the case in this study and the others cited earlier. Accordingly, they propose 
several research designs to estimate the importance of voluntary programs in diffusing 
information on potential efficiency gains, including potential differences in the rate of such 
diffusion among participants and nonparticipants, and the extent of diffusion outside traditional 
industry boundaries. While not definitive, these suggestions imply that further methodological 
development may be appropriate for the evaluation of voluntary programs, even beyond the 
approach adopted in the present study. Resources for the Future  Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Tables 
Table 1. Enrollment Data for Climate Wise and DOE 1605(b) Participants 
  Climate Wise  1605(b) Program 
Enrollment 
year 
Plant Corporate  Subtotal 
Plant Corporate  Subtotal 
1994  0 8 8  0  105  105 
1995  7  30 37  0 37 37 
1996  38 141  179  3 23 26 
1997  37 101  138  2 15 17 
1998  36 70 106  8 53 61 
1999  72 17 89  2 33 35 
2000 144  0  144 6  53  59 
Total  304 367 671  21 319 340 
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Table 2 . Matching of Climate Wise (CW) and 1605(b) to LRD 
 
  CW List  LRD Plants  LRD plant–year 
observations 
(1992–2001) 




with multiple plants 
135 2,053  11,503  54  1,762  8,724 
Corporate participants 
with a single plant 
93 95  316  13 13  63 
Plant-level participants  149  163  946  16  16  122 
            
Total 377  2,311  12,765  83 1,791  8,909 
 
Table 3. Sample Statistics for LRD and CW and 1605(b) Program Participants   
 
   CW  1605(b) 









(total value of 
shipments) 
Mean 7.61  10.87  7.80  10.99 
Standard deviation  2.30  1.81  2.34  2.17 
Plant–year observations  1,157,606  12,605  871,316  8,758 
ln(CF) 
(cost of fuels) 
Mean 2.54  5.31  2.69  5.36 
Standard deviation  2.12  2.23  2.18  2.32 




Mean 3.17  6.31  3.34  6.22 
Standard deviation  2.21  1.83  2.25  2.17 
Plant–year observations  1,019,042  12,377  784,502  8,564 
          
  Number of Plants  515,189  2,311  385,531  1,791 
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Table 4. The Sector Distribution for 1605(b) Reporting Entities and for 
Matched 1605(b) and LRD Data 








Note: Items marked with D* are included in “Other.” 
 
Table 5. Estimated Program Effects Using a Simple Regression Model 
 1605(b)  Climate  Wise 
Cohort Fuel  Electricity  Sample  Participants Fuel  Electricity  Sample  Participants 
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Table 6. Effect of the 1605(b) Program on the Natural Log of Fuel Expenditures over 
Different Horizons: Propensity Score Matching Approach 
Matching model (all models include logged value of shipments, cost of fuels, 
cost of electricity, and growth in shipments) 
Matched 
sample 
Industry x  x     x  
Region x  x    x    
Quadratic x     x x  x  
              
Mean              
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Note: Data are pooled across cohorts and the difference-in-difference is based on propensity score nearest neighbor 
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Table 7. Effect of the 1605(b) Program on the Natural Log of Fuel Expenditures over 
Different Horizons 
Model (all models include logged value of shipments, cost of fuels, cost of 
electricity, and growth in shipments) 
Matched 
sample 
Industry x  x     x  
Region x  x    x    
Quadratic x     x x  x   
              
Mean              
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Note: Data are pooled across cohorts and the difference-in-difference is based on propensity score nearest neighbor 
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Table 8. Effect of the EPA Climate Wise Program on the Natural Log of Fuel Expenditures 
over Different Horizons 
Model (all models include logged value of shipments, cost of fuels, cost of 
electricity, and growth in shipments) 
Matched 
sample 
Industry   x  x        x   
Region x  x     x    
Quadratic  x     x  x x   
              
Mean              
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Note: Data are pooled across cohorts and the difference-in-difference is based on propensity score nearest neighbor 
matching. 
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Table 9. Effect of EPA Climate Wise Program on the Natural Log of Fuel Expenditures 
over Different Horizons 
Model (all models include logged value of shipments, cost of fuels, cost of 
electricity, and growth in shipments) 
Matched 
sample 
Industry x  x     x  
Region x  x    x    
Quadratic x     x x  x   
              
Mean              
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Note: Data are pooled across cohorts and the difference-in-difference is based on propensity score nearest neighbor 
matching. 
 
 